

CSCI 1800 Cybersecurity and International Relations

Attribution and Privacy

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Outline

- Review of types of cyber attacks
- Attribution problem
- Methods to avoid attribution
- Detecting attribution
- Alternatives to attribution
- Intro to deterrence on the Internet
- The impersonation problem
- Based on
 - [Untangling Attribution](#), Clark and Landau, Procs. Workshop on Detering Cyberattacks, National Research Council, 2010.
 - [A Survey of Challenges in Attribution](#), Boebert, Procs. Workshop on Detering Cyberattacks, National Research Council, 2010.

Types of Internet-Based Attacks

- Distributed denial of service (DDoS) – botnet based
 - Goal: Overwhelm with data, possibly using amplification
- Penetration attacks – uses malicious functionality
 - Goal: Control the machine that is attacked.
- Exploitation attacks – a penetration attack
 - Goal: Penetrate to extract valuable information
- Destructive attacks – a penetration attack
 - Goal: Destroy/disrupt valuable system component or attached resource, either temporarily or permanently.

The Attribution Problem



“On the Internet, nobody knows that you’re a dog.”

The Attribution Problem

- Attribution important in deterring attacks.
 - If attribution of attacker were known to be easy, attackers may be deterred by threat of retribution.
- Attribution is known to be hard. Why is it?
 - Technical attribution
 - Who owns the attacking machine?
 - Where is the machine located?
 - Is the attacker hiding behind a proxy?
 - Human attribution
 - Who launched the attack?
 - For whom was that person acting?

Coping with Attacks

- Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
 - Difficult to stop. Attribution not very helpful given that it must be stopped ASAP.
 - Retribution after the fact not a good deterrent. Attacker is hard to find.
 - **Best bet:** hire orgs with “big pipes” that can filter data
- **Attacks on critical infrastructures** require significant reconnaissance effort.
 - A **diligent defender** might catch the attacker in the act and, possibly, stop the attack.

Barriers to Technical Attribution



- Botnets – thousands to millions of nodes.
 - Used for DDoS, spam, phishing, password attacks
- Proxy
 - Host provides services, e.g. filtering, authentication, etc.
- Anonymous proxy
 - Hides source, e.g. Network Address Translators (NATs)
- Fast Flux – quick change in IP addresses
- Anonymous routing – The Onion Router (Tor*) & Freegate**
 - They make it difficult to monitor traffic
- Covert communications
 - E.g. Steganography: message hidden inside another message

* For Tor see <https://www.torproject.org/>

** For Freegate see <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freegate>

The Onion Router (TOR)


- Goal is to hide Internet communications.



- Alice picks 3 proxy nodes. Messages & destinations encrypted. The proxies used are hidden from Yves.
- PKI used. Public/secret keys P_i and S_i used by M_i .
- Tor developed by US Naval Research Labs for USG.


Onion Routing

- Alice's message goes from P_1 , to P_2 , to P_3 , to D.
- Message and destinations encrypted inside out.



Onion Routing

- Alice sends message M_1 to proxy P_1 .
- Proxy P_1 decrypts M_1 , sends result to P_2 who decrypts M_2 , and sends it to P_3 . Finally, P_3 decrypts M_3 (to reveal M and D) and sends result to D .
- Generalizes to more than three proxies.



Identity on the Internet

- Secure real identities and pseudonyms are possible and needed on the Internet.
- Identity can be assured via public-key encryption
 - Sender sends identifying message encrypted with private key
 - Receiver uses sender's public key to verify sender identity
- **Identity defined by social media accounts is not secure**
- Secure pseudonyms acquired via **trusted third parties**.
 - Person needing pseudonym acquires one from a third party.
 - **If pseudonym providers are federated**, the trust boundary extends to all who acquire identities from the federation.

Identity Theft

- Insurance Information Institute says 14.4 million Americans had identities stolen in 2018.
- Many techniques are used to steal identities.
- In 2017 **Equifax** lost personal records, including SSNs, drivers licenses, addresses, etc., on 147 million Americans, that is, most adults.
 - In **February 2020** US charged four members of the PLA military for the theft

* See <https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-identity-theft-and-cybercrime>

Starting Points for Technical Attribution

- Indicators of compromise (IOCs)
 - Anomalous behavior, unusual activity records
 - Known IP addresses, type of malware
 - Hash of large pieces of data (see reputation services)
- Tools
 - Attackers don't change their tools very often
- Behavior
 - Humans are creatures of habit, same working hours
- Language
 - Comments in software reflect national language

Detecting Attribution

- Source IP addresses help police identify attacker
 - Identifies jurisdiction, can lead to search warrant.
- Geo-locate within postal code from IP address*
 - Use traceroute to find path to destination
- Multistage attacks – many hop points between attacker & victim. Hard to peel back but doable.
- Onion routers can obscure hopping, as we saw
 - But traffic analysis may reveal routes

* See <http://www.maxmind.com/>

The Willie Sutton Principle

- Willie Sutton was a notorious bank robber
 - **When asked why he robbed banks**, he is (falsely) reported to have said **“That’s where the money is!”**
- Sutton’s Law is taught in medical schools
 - Treat the obvious illness first!
- To **find cyber criminals, follow the money!**
 - Clients of criminal services **must pay for them!**
 - E.g., fake drugs firms must process credit cards
 - Criminals must **deliver goods** or be discovered!

Attribution Is Also a Political Problem

- In 2004 an ITU official proposed that
 - IPv6 address blocks be allocated by states
 - It would “harden” the linkage between IP addresses and other information.
- What are advantages and disadvantages?
 - It would be easier for states to identify and punish citizens for activity that they declare illegal.
 - It would clearly identify states with malicious activity and provide other states with a lever to request action.
- What other implications might follow?

Nature of the Attribution Problem

- Untangling Attribution by Clark and Landau*
 - It is primarily a policy problem, not a technical one.
 - Attribution of forensic quality in US not possible.
 - Application level attribution via cryptographic means may be possible – break the cypher
 - Fine-grained attribution can be threat to privacy
 - Multi-stage (multi-hop) attacks are hardest to solve
 - Deterrence best achieved through diplomatic action, such as norms and treaties.

* <https://www.nap.edu/read/12997/chapter/4>

Deterrence Alternatives

- Hack-back* – attack the attacker (via his toolkit?)
 - Appears to be illegal under US law.
- Mount covert preemptive attack against sites suspected to be planning an attack.
- To identify humans, it may be useful to record and replay intruder actions to identify him/her via keystroke analysis, venue, time of day, observance of holidays, language, etc.

* See http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/06/17/exploiting_online_attackers/

Deterrence in General

- Individuals deterred from aggressive action by
 - Likelihood and severity of retribution
 - Frustration
- But actions have unintended consequences
 - “blow-back” on friends and self is possible
- Cyber attacks generally do not have kinetic effect
 - An obstacle to attack is lack of certainty of effect
- Note: Response to attack need not be immediate
- US Government has used sanctions effectively against Russian oligarchs and Chinese military

The Impersonation Problem

- NYT has reported that “followers” are being sold on Twitter, Facebook and LinkedIn*
 - Devumi (US based) **sells** them to those seeking fame!
- A **follower** is an **impersonation**, a **nearly identical replica of a real person**
 - Millions of impersonations are circulating on web
 - They used to amplify real & fake news

* <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/01/27/technology/social-media-bots.html>

The Impersonation Problem

- Impersonations are causing grief to real people†
 - Dozens of complaints have failed to eliminate them
- A person is easily confused with impersonation
 - Reputations are being damaged
- Social media companies have policies against this
 - But they don't always enforce them.
 - They do require proof of identity to shut them down
- Governments may intervene
 - **Companies have become ID validators!**

† <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/technology/social-media-impostor-accounts.html>

Review

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