

CSCI 1800 Cybersecurity and International Relations

Cyber Attacks

John E. Savage

Brown University

Outline

- 2012 Flame espionage software discovered
- 2012 Shamoon wiper attack on Saudi Aramco
- 2013 Mandiant Report on APT1
- 2013 US Defense Science Board Report
- 2013-2018 Carbanak – The Great Bank Robbery
- 2014 Regin surveillance toolkit discovered
- 2014-5 JP Morgan penetration
- 2015 Ukraine power grid
- 2016 DNC hack
- 2017 NotPetya
- 2017 Equifax breach
- 2018 New Vulnerabilities to Disinformation

Today's Readings

- Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare by Jon R. Lindsay, *Security Studies*, August 2013
- Inside Project Raven
- USA Karma
- Web War I: The Cyberattack that Changed the World.

Optional Readings

- Significant Cyber Incidents, CSIS' large database of prominent cyber attacks since 2006.
- APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units, Mandiant, 2013.
- Advanced Persistent Threats: A Symantec Perspective, Symantec
- Exploit Kits published by F-Secure.
- SON OF STUXNET: The Digital Hunt for Duqu, a Dangerous and Cunning U.S.-Israeli Spy Virus by Kim Zetter, The Intercept, November 12, 2014

Flame

- Goal: **Espionage** in Middle East, not damage
 - Found in 2012, started in ~2007, suicide command sent to it on 6/8/12 from its command & control site
 - Called the most complex malware ever found
 - Highly modular and **at least 20 times size of Stuxnet**
 - Records audio, screen shots, keyboard activity, Skype sessions and network traffic. Disguised as MSFT update!
 - Collected AutoCAD files (designs), PDFs, and text files
- Wash Post* said was developed by NSA and Israel. Leaked document said done by NSA and GCHQ.

* https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-israel-developed-computer-virus-to-slow-iranian-nuclear-efforts-officials-say/2012/06/19/gJQA6xBPoV_story.html

Attacks on Oil Producers

- The **Shamoon** malware, found in 8/12, overwrote **master boot record** of computers (first track of disk) making them unusable.
- Shamoon wiped 30,000 Saudi Aramco machines!
 - Saudi Aramco is biggest OPEC oil producer!
 - Production not halted but valuable info lost.
 - Attacker took control of one computer, propagated malware to others, then disabled them together.
- **Was it retaliation** for Flame attack against Iran?

2013 Mandiant Report

- Mandiant* investigated **APT†** groups since 2004
- Concludes **Chinese group (APT1)** most prolific.
 - APT1 active since 2006
 - Reported on APT1 because of its scale and impact
- Mandiant examined ~150 attacks on victims.
- Discovered APT1's attack infrastructure, Command & Control, and modus operandi (TTP)
- Also identified APT1 personnas.

* http://cs.brown.edu/courses/csci1800/sources/2013_Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf

† <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/05/21-cyber-threat-singer>

Meet the Chinese hackers accused of cyber-espionage

Listening to rock music, playing Angry Birds and obsessed with coding: a portrait of the five alleged Chinese army hackers wanted by the FBI



(Clockwise from top left) Sun Kailiang, Wen Xinyu, Wang Dong, Gu Chunhui and Huang Zhenyu Photo: Reuters

Mandiant Report (cont.)

- Believes APT1 is likely government-sponsored and one of China's most persistent threat actors
- Tracked APT1 back to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) **Unit 61398** in a Shanghai building.
- APT1 has stolen hundreds of terabytes of info from 141 organizations.
- Can steal simultaneously from dozens of orgs.
- **Has about 1,000 C&C sites** around the world.

APT Methodology

- Decide on target, e.g. F35 stealth jet designs
 - E.g. Lockheed Martin or Boeing
- Form a team of specialists with following roles:
 1. Identify key personnel & system vulnerabilities
 - This **reconnaissance can take months**
 2. Professional intrusion team breaches system
 - Requires clever campaign to reach potential victims
 - Perhaps enters via service company, e.g. HVAC
 3. Reconnaissance team installs remote access tools (RATs)
 4. Now the target is “pwned” (error in “owned”)

APT Methodology

- Exploitation team now does disciplined research
 - Plan for long stay
 - Insert new backdoors for reentry
 - Ensure RAT not visible, e.g. keep loads on processors small
 - Analyze folders for interesting file names
 - Capture data at network access points
 - Collect and encrypt data for surreptitious exfiltration
 - Possibly activate cameras & microphones
- Some files may be sabotaged, not just copied!

Persistence of APTs

- 2016 – FireEye says APTs persisted for 146 days on average world wide, 469 days in EMEA
- 2015 – Trustwave says 81% of APTs not detected by internal security procedures
 - Often discovered by news reports, law enforcement or external fraud monitoring

US Defense Science Board Report

- 2-year 2017 report* on cyber deterrence concludes
 - Russia, China, Iran & North Korea can put US critical infrastructure (CI) at risk via cyber
 - Can also thwart US responses – an untenable position
- US and the private sector must
 - Boost cyber resilience overall
 - Create a cyber deterrence strategy for each adversary
 - Protect select strike systems, cyber, nuclear, non-nuclear
 - Enhance cyber attribution, make joint forces & CI resilient

* https://dsb.cto.mil/reports/2010s/DSB-CyberDeterrenceReport_02-28-17_Final.pdf

Carbanak – Great Bank Robbery

- 2013- ????? Gang stole **\$1Billion** from 100 banks!
 - Example of commercial APT – **still active!**
 - Kaspersky thinks nation state behind it!
- Multi-national gang from Russian, Ukrainian, other EU, and China deploy Carbanak malware
 - <http://fortune.com/2018/03/26/carbanak-europol-arrest-spain-malware-banks/>
 - http://krebsonsecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Carbanak_APT_eng.pdf
 - <https://www.scmagazineuk.com/carbanak-active-latest-cyber-bank-heist-took-months-carry/article/1586531>

Regin*

- Malware toolkit for persistent mass surveillance revealed in 2014 by Symantec, Kaspersky, Intercept
- Said to have been developed by NSA and GCHQ
- Targeted primarily Russia, Saudi Arabia and many others to a much larger extent
- Like Flame, Regin uses a modular approach to load features that fit the target.
- Stealthy. Uses special virtual encrypted file system
- Unusual communication modalities with C&C server
- Spied on Belgacom, a Belgian telecom
- Found on USB owned by an Angela Merkel staffer

* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regin_\(malware\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regin_(malware))

2014 JP Morgan Intrusion

- US Attorney: one of largest hacks ever discovered!
- 7 major financial insts., JP Morgan largest
 - Identified potential stock traders
 - Spammed them with positive info on penny stocks
 - Dumped the stocks when they ran up (pump & dump)
- Data stolen from **100 Million customers**
- Hackers got \$10s millions by pumping & dumping
- Two Israelis and one American accused of crime

* <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/jpmorgan-discovers-further-cyber-security-issues/>

† <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/business/dealbook/prosecutors-announce-more-charges-in-jpmorgan-cyberattack.html>

Ukraine Power Grid Compromise

- In December 2015 attacker **compromised electricity control centers** in Western Ukraine
- $\geq 230,000$ residents lost power for up to 6 hours
- **First cyber op to take down an energy grid**
 - Power was restored by physically closing switches
- The electricity grid attacked again in 2016

2016 DNC Exploitation

- This was the work of a Russian team called by various names, such as APT28, Fancy Bear, names for a GRU hacking team.
- The GRU is Russian military intelligence.
- Investigated by special prosecutor Robert Mueller.

The NotPetya Worm

Most Devastating Cyberattack in History*

- On 6/27/17 Russia launched **worm** in **update software** for Ukraine's **M.E.Doc accounting software**
 - Estimated 10% of all computers in Ukraine corrupted!
- Effect spread quickly all over the world
 - Federal Express hit at a cost of \$400 Million
 - Maersk, world's largest shipper, cost was \$300 Million
 - **Maersk crippled in 7 mins!**
 - **Merck lost \$1.3B!**
- White House estimated **NotPetya cost** at **\$10Billion!**

* <https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/>

The NotPetya Worm

Most Devastating Cyberattack in History*

- NotPetya built using
 - NSA's **EternalBlue**, attacks SMB – **ShadowBrokers**
 - French tool, Mimikatz, **scrapes** RAM passwords
- Unpatched machines infected first. Then worm jumped to patched ones using **stolen** passwords!
- “[I]t was the equivalent of using a nuclear bomb to achieve a small tactical victory.” – Bossert†
- **Nation-state weapon loosed in borderless world!**

* <https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/>

† Tom Bossert was the White House Homeland Security Advisor

Effect of NotPetya Worm

- Port Authority closed Maersk's NJ terminal
 - Just-in-Time supply chain was in serious trouble
 - Wait or opt for very expensive shipping alternative?
- Several days later staffers called to English office
- Essential domain controllers were wiped
 - Necessary to decide which users have which access
 - One controller found in Ghana – off before infection
 - Relay set up to carry gigabyte file to England
 - Ops restarted in two weeks, completed in 2 months

The NotPetya Worm

- Experts believe Russians were sending a message – don't do business in Ukraine.
- Experts agree this type of event can occur again.
- Some say it's the Sputnik event of cyberspace
- But it has not yet been recognized as such.

The 2017 Equifax Breach

- The breach due to bug in Apache Struts
- Bug revealed in 3/2017, not fixed by Equifax
 - Equifax CEO: One person was responsible to fix such bugs!
- Avivah Litan of Gartner Inc.: “On a scale of 1 to 10, [it] is a 10. It affects the whole credit reporting system in the United States because nobody can recover it, everyone uses the same data.”
- Senator Mark Warner: “In today’s information economy, data is an enormous asset. But if companies like Equifax can’t properly safeguard [it] then they shouldn’t be collecting it in the first place.”

More on 2017 Equifax Breach

- From about 5/13 – 7/30/18 hackers had access to names, SSNs, driver's licenses, addresses, email addresses, credit card expiration dates, taxpayer ID numbers of 145.5 million Americans!
- A cybersecurity loss can be very expensive.
 - Such info widely used, even for disaster relief!
- **Victims did not provide this information to Equifax but Equifax claims they own it.**

The 2017 Equifax Breach

- Equifax waited about six weeks to report breach
- Execs sold \$2 M stock 2 days before breach notice
- Board of Directors has fiduciary responsibility for co.
- Breach suggests failure by CEO & Equifax board
 - They should have ensured that security had priority
- 2/20/20 – Four PLA officers charged with breach.
 - They routed traffic through 34 servers in 20 countries
 - Encrypted communication
 - Deleted log files daily to remove evidence of hacking

New Vulnerability to Disinformation

- Nations that experience political divisions are vulnerable to disinformation campaigns
 - Many Western nations are in political turmoil
 - E.g. France, Germany, Poland, Hungary, US
- Social media amplify emotional attachment
 - Algorithms are designed to keep users on sites
 - Human interest issues attract attention
 - Provides a vehicle to weaponize information

Social Media Vulnerabilities

- Nations want to address these vulnerabilities
- The question is “How should they do that?”
 - Legislatively?
 - By regulation of social media companies?
 - Via the public?
- There is risk associated with premature action
- Scholarly study is needed
 - **You can contribute!**

Review

- 2012 Flame espionage software discovered
- 2012 Shamoon wiper attack on Saudi Aramco
- 2013 Mandiant Report on APT1
- 2013 US Defense Science Board Report
- 2013-2015 Carbanak – The Great Bank Robbery
- 2014 Regin surveillance toolkit discovered
- 2014-5 JP Morgan penetration
- 2015 Ukraine power grid
- 2016 DNC hack
- 2017 NotPetya
- 2017 Equifax breach
- 2018 New Vulnerabilities to Disinformation