# CSCI 1800 Cybersecurity and International Relations 

Secure Communication and Authentication

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## Outline

- Symmetric Cryptography
- Public-Key Cryptography
- Cryptographic Hash Functions
- Digital Signatures
- Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange


## The Cryptographic Problem

- Goal: Alice needs to communicate securely with Bob, but Eve listens or interferes with conversation.
- Approach: Alice and Bob encrypt messages (they create ciphertexts) to keep them secure from Eve.
- Eve engages in cryptanalysis, tries to break cipher.
- Security by obscurity is dangerous. Once obscure method is discovered, all secrets are lost.
- Better to assume encryption method is known but that keys remain secret. Keys can be changed.


## Three Types of Notation

| Decimal | Binary |
| :--- | :--- |
| 0 | 0000 |
| 1 | 0001 |
| 2 | 0010 |
| 3 | 0011 |
| 4 | 0100 |
| 5 | 0101 |
| 6 | 0110 |
| 7 | 0111 |
| 8 | 1000 |
| 9 | 1001 |
| 10 | 1010 |
| 11 | 1011 |
| 12 | 1101 |
| 13 | 1110 |
| 14 | 1111 |
| 15 |  |
|  |  |


| Hex | Binary |
| :--- | :--- |
| 0 | 0000 |
| 1 | 0001 |
| 2 | 0010 |
| 3 | 0011 |
| 4 | 0100 |
| 5 | 0101 |
| 6 | 0110 |
| 7 | 1000 |
| 8 | 1001 |
| 9 | 1010 |
| A | 1011 |
| B | 1100 |
| C | 1101 |
| D | 1110 |
| E | 1111 |
| F |  |
|  |  |


| Decimal | Binary | Octal |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 000000 | 00 |
| 1 | 000001 | 01 |
| 2 | 000010 | 02 |
| 3 | 000011 | 03 |
| 4 | 000100 | 04 |
| 5 | 000101 | 05 |
| 6 | 000110 | 06 |
| 7 | 000111 | 07 |
| 8 | 001000 | 10 |
| 9 | 001001 | 11 |
| 10 | 001010 | 12 |
| 11 | 001011 | 13 |
| 12 | 001100 | 14 |
| 13 | 001101 | 15 |
| 14 | 001110 | 16 |
| 15 | 001111 | 17 |
| 16 | 010000 | 20 |

## American Standard Code for

 Information Interchange (ASCII)| Dec HxOct Char |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 000 NUL | (null) |
|  | 1001 SOH | (start of heading) |
|  | 2002 STX | (start of text) |
|  | 3003 ETX | (end of text) |
| 4 | 4004 E0T | (end of transmission) |
|  | 5005 ENQ | (encuiry) |
|  | 6006 ACK | (acknowledge) |
|  | 7007 BEL | (bell) |
| 8 | 8010 BS | (backspace) |
| 9 | 011 TAB | (horizontal tab) |
|  | A 012 LF | (NL line feed, new line) |
|  | B 013 VT | (vertical tab) |
|  | C 014 FF | (NP forli feed, new page) |
|  | D 015 CR | (carriage return) |
|  | E 01650 | (shift out) |
|  | F 017 SI | (shift in) |
|  | 10020 DLE | (data link escape) |
|  | 11021 DCl | (device control 1) |
|  | 12022 DC2 | (device control 2) |
|  | 13023 DC3 | (device control 3) |
|  | 14024 DC4 | (device control 4) |
|  | 15025 NAK | (negative acknowledge) |
|  | 16026 SYN | (synchronous idle) |
|  | 17027 ETB | (end of trans. block) |
| 24 | 18030 CAN | (cancel) |
|  | 19031 EM | (end of medium) |
|  | 1A 032 SUB | (substitute) |
| 27 | 1 B 033 ESC | (escape) |
| 28 | 1 C 034 FS | (file separator) |
| 29 | 1D 035 GS | (group separator) |
| 30 | 1E 036 RS | (record separator) |
|  | 1 F 037 US | (unit separator) |

Dec Hx Oct Html Chr Dec Hx Oct Html Chr $_{\mathrm{H}}$ Dec Hx Oct Html Chr


Source: www.LookupTables.com

## Message Fragment in Binary

- Map message: no mon no fun to ASCII
- n 156 o 157 (space) 040
- 001101111001101111000100000
- m 155 o 157 n 156 (space) 040
- 001101101001101111001101111000100000
- n 156 o 157 (space) 040
- 001101110001101111000010000
- f 146 u 165 n 156
- 001010110001110101001101111
- Concatenate bits to form integer message $\mathbf{M}=0011011$...


## Symmetric Cryptography

- They agree on a common encryption method.
- Both Alice and Bob have the same secret key.
- Convert a text message to an integer M.
- Example: no mon no fun
- \156\157\040\155\157\156\040\156\157\040\146\165\156
- Slashes between octal triplets are for humans only - M = 001101110001101111000100111 ...
- Encrypt $M$ as $C=E_{K}(M)$ using function E and key K.
- Decrypt C same way, $M=E_{K}(C)$. $K$ is secret. Symmetric!


## Eve Attempts to Get Secret Key

- Ciphertext-only attack (least info)
- Eve only has ciphertext.
- Known-plaintext attack
- Eve is given plaintext-ciphertext pair(s).
- Chosen-plaintext attack
- Eve chooses plaintext(s), gets ciphertext(s). She may choose plaintexts adaptively.
- Chosen-ciphertext attack (most info)
- Eve chooses ciphertext, gets plaintext.


## Ciphers Introduced in Today's Lecture

- Substitution ciphers
- Polygraphic substitution ciphers
- One-time pads
- Binary one-time pads
- Advanced encryption standard (AES)
- Public-key cryptography (RSA)
- Digital signatures and hash functions


## Substitution Ciphers

- Substitution ciphers permute letters in alphabet - E.g. Caesar replaced a letter by one three places away in the Latin alphabet.
- Caesar(3): a b c d ... x y z is replaced by defg... a b c
- General substitution cipher - map letters in an alphabet to a fixed permutation of the alphabet.


## Frequency of Letters in English



## Breaking Substitution Ciphers

- Substitution ciphers are easily broken
- Compute the frequency of each letter
- Find the most frequent letter, let's call it $\alpha$.
- Almost certainly e maps to $\alpha$ with frequency ~12\%
- Find the second most frequent letter, $\beta$.
- Almost certainly t maps to $\beta$ with freq. ~ 9\%
- Check words that result and fix mapping.


## Vigenère Cipher

- Vigenère cipher (1586) is a polygraphic cipher on blocks of m letters. Given m letters $\left(I_{1}, l_{2}, \ldots, I\right), I_{\mathrm{j}}$ is shifted cyclically by $\mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{j}}$ places for $0 \leq \mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{j}} \leq 25$.
- If $m=3, k_{1}=2, k_{2}=1, k_{3}=3,(a, g, z)$ mapped to ( $c, h, c$ ).
- Let's encrypt attackatdawn
$-(a, t, t)(a, c, k)(a, t, d)(a, w, n) \Rightarrow(c, u, w)(c, d, n)(c, u, g)(c, x, p)$
- Encrypted message is cuwcdncugcxp
- If is reasonably small, easily broken by statistics.


## Vigenère Cipher

- If $m$ is reasonably small, the Vigenère cipher is easily broken by statistics.
- How would you do that?
- The integers can be derived from a text string
- thequickbrownfoxjumpsoverthelazydog
- Start alphabet at $0 ; \mathrm{a} \leftrightarrow 0, \mathrm{~b} \leftrightarrow 1, \ldots, \mathrm{t} \leftrightarrow 19, \ldots, \mathrm{z} \leftrightarrow 25$,
- 1974162082101171422135142392012151814 214171971103146
- Does this look like a random string?
- How many times are digits repeated?


## One-Time Pad

- One-time pad (Miller 1882) uses m random integers $\left\{k_{j} \mid 1 \leq j \leq m\right\}, 0 \leq k_{j} \leq 25$, to shift letters in a string of length $\leq m$.
- The $\mathrm{j}^{\text {th }}$ letter is shifted by $\mathrm{k}_{\mathrm{j}}$ positions.
- A real one-time pad might have edible pages of digits.
- Both sender and receiver need to know shifts
- Provides perfect security when $m \geq$ message length
- Fails when pad is reused or string is longer than $m$.
- One-time pad encryption broken during Cold War.


## Binary One-Time Pad Again

- Message represented as n-bit binary string.
- E.g. $\mathrm{M}^{=}$
(a vector)
- Generate random n-bit string K (the key or one-time pad)
- E.g. $\underline{K}=100110$ (a vector)
- $\operatorname{XOR}(\oplus)$ is defined as $1 \oplus 0=0 \oplus 1=1$ and $0 \oplus 0=1 \oplus 1=0$
- XOR message M with key $\underline{K}$ bit-by-bit to encrypt as $X$.

$$
\begin{gathered}
\underline{X}=E_{K}(\underline{M})=\underline{M} \oplus \underline{K} \\
\text { - E.g. } E_{\underline{K}}(\underline{M})=(\oplus 1)(\oplus 0)(\oplus 0)(\oplus 1)(\oplus 1)(\oplus 0)=110101
\end{gathered}
$$

- Decrypt by encrypting $\underline{X}$ with $\underline{K}$

$$
\mathrm{E}_{\underline{K}}(\underline{X})=\underline{X} \oplus \underline{K}=(\underline{\mathrm{M}} \oplus \underline{K}) \oplus \underline{K}=\underline{M} \oplus(\underline{\mathrm{~K}} \oplus \underline{\mathrm{~K}})=\underline{\mathrm{M}} \oplus \underline{0}=\underline{\mathrm{M}}
$$

## Reuse of One-Time Pad Dangerous

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { SEND } \\
& \text { CASA }
\end{aligned}
$$


$\mathrm{C}_{2}$

## XORing Two Encrypted Images

$$
\underline{C}_{1}=\underline{K} \oplus \underline{M}_{1} \quad \underline{C}_{2}=\underline{K} \oplus \underline{M}_{2} \quad \underline{C}_{1} \oplus \underline{C}_{2}=\underline{M}_{1} \oplus \mathbf{M}_{2}
$$



## Pseudo-Random Number Generators

- It is expensive to produce true random nos.
- Pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) generate numbers that "look" random.

- Encryption algorithms can be used as PRNGs.
- Encrypt a fixed string and represent it in binary
- E.g. E(attackatdawn) $=0100110101001110110$


## Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (Rough Sketch)

- AES (circa 2001) is a symmetric cipher whose inputs and outputs are 128-bit blocks. It uses an encryption key K of length 128,192 or 256 bits, denoted AES-128, AES-192, AES-256.



## Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

- When $\underline{K}$ has 128 bits, AES computes $\underline{X}_{0}=\underline{M} \oplus \underline{K}$ and then executes 10 rounds.
- Each round does a substitution, permutation, mixing of results, and an XOR'ing step.
- It is too complicated to explain here.
- AES is highly secure but can be attacked using the time spent computing - this is a
- In 2010 AES-256 was considered highly secure.
- AES-192 and AES-256 approved for US Top Secret!


## Public-Key Cryptography

- Each party has public \& private keys
- Alice: Priv Alice Pub $_{\text {Alice }}$; Bob: Priv $_{\text {Bob }}$, Pub $_{\text {Bob }}$.
- Alice encrypts message M for Bob with

$$
X=E_{K}(M) \text { where } K=P_{\text {ub }} \text { Bob. }
$$

- Bob decrypts Alice's encrypted message with

$$
M=E_{K^{*}}(X) \text { where } K^{*}=\operatorname{Priv}_{\text {Bob }} .
$$

- Decrypt using same algorithm E with private key


## Origin of Public-Key Cryptography

- James Ellis, Clifford Cocks, Malcolm Williamson, invented it at GCHQ (British intelligence agency) by 1973, made public in 1997
- Diffie and Hellman propose idea publicly in '76.
- Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) gave first practical implementation in 1977.
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography


## Symmetric vs Public Key Crypto

- Symmetric key system has one key per user pair - Thus, there are $n(n-1) / 2$ (pairs) keys for $n$ users - If $n=10^{4}$, that's about $50 \times 10^{6}$ keys!
- In public-key system, $2 n$ keys suffice.
- Each party publishes one key, keeps other secret
- Symmetric key system faster than public key.
- PK systems often used to create/exchange secret symmetric keys


## RSA Public-Key System

- Modular arithmetic
- add and multiply integers modulo $n$
- result is the remainder after dividing by $n$.
- E.g. $(3+4) \bmod 5=2,(4 * 3) \bmod 3=0$
- Bob's public key Pub $_{B}$ is the integer pair (e,n).
- Bob's secret key is $\operatorname{Priv}_{\mathrm{B}}=. \mathrm{n}=\mathrm{pq}$, two primes
- Require that $e, d$, and $n$ satisfy
$X^{e} \bmod n=X$ for any integer $X$ in $\{0,1,2, \ldots n-1\}$,


## RSA Public-Key System

- Alice encrypts $M$ for Bob as $C=M^{e} \bmod n$
- Recall Pub ${ }_{B}=(e, n)$
- Bob decrypts $C$ by computing $C \bmod n=M$. This follows because
$C \bmod n=\left(M^{e}\right) \bmod n=M^{e} \bmod n=M$
- Bob can also encrypt $M$ as $C=M \bmod n$ and decrypt with $\mathrm{C}^{\mathrm{e}}$ mod n because

$$
C^{e} \bmod n=(M)^{e} \bmod n=M^{e} \bmod n=M!
$$

## Security of RSA

- Security dependent on difficulty of finding $d$ given e and n .
- Security closely tied to factoring n . So far integer factorization is considered very hard to do.
- A mathematical proof of security of RSA is a very important open problem.


## Cryptographic Hash Functions

- A cryptographic hash function compresses a message M into fixed-length sequence $\mathrm{H}(\mathrm{M})$. Mapping is one-way and collision-resistant.
- A function is one-way if it is computationally difficult to find $M$ given $H(M)$.
- It is weakly collision-resistant if it is difficult to find a message $M^{\prime}$ with $H\left(M^{\prime}\right)=H(M)$ given just $H(M)$.
- It is strongly collision-resistant if is difficult to find both $M$ and $M^{\prime}$ with $H\left(M^{\prime}\right)=H(M)$.


## Digital Signatures

- A digital signature of a message is a way for an entity to prove that the sender sent message $M$.
- Alice computes $H(M)$, hash of $M$, and forms $S_{\text {Alice }}(M)$ by encrypting $H(M)$ with her private key.
- She sends Bob (M, $\mathrm{S}_{\text {Alice }}(\mathrm{M})$ ).
- Bob confirms that $M$ has not changed in transit and that Alice sent it but computing $\mathrm{H}(\mathrm{M})$ and comparing it to the decryption of $\mathrm{S}_{\text {Alice }}(\mathrm{M})$ ) with her public key.


## Diffie-Helman Key Exchange

- Symmetric encryption is much faster than public-key encryption.
- Diffie and Helman invented a technique that two parties can use to agree on a secret key
- Both parties can use this key for symmetric encryption.


## Diffie-Helman Key Exchange

- $\mathbf{B} \& \mathrm{~A}$ choose prime $p \&$ primitive root $g \bmod p$.
$-g$ is primitive if for each $r$ integer in $\{0,1,2, \ldots, p-1\}, r$ satisfies $r=g^{k} \bmod p$ for some integer $k$.
- Alice's secret is $a$ and is.
- A sends $r=g^{a} \bmod p$ to B .
- B sends $=g \bmod p$.
- A computes ${ }^{a} \bmod p$.
- B computes $r \bmod p$.
- Let $\mathrm{Q}={ }^{a} \bmod p=(g \bmod p)^{a}=g^{a} \bmod p=g^{a}$ $\bmod p=r \bmod p$. The common secret is Q !


## Security of Diffie-Hellman

- The values of a and are secret.
- Alice sends $r=g^{a} \bmod p$ to B in the clear.
- Bob sends $=g \bmod p$ to Alice in the clear.
- These transmissions reveal a and IF it is possible to deduce a from $r=g^{a} \bmod p$ or from $=g \bmod p$.
- This is the discrete logarithm problem.
- No polynomial time algorithm is known for it.


## Review

- Symmetric Cryptography
- Public-Key Cryptography
- Cryptographic Hash Functions
- Digital Signatures
- Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

