CSCI 1800 Cybersecurity and International Relations

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Outline

- Symmetric Cryptography
- Public-Key Cryptography
- Cryptographic Hash Functions
- Digital Signatures
- Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

The Cryptographic Problem

- Goal: Alice needs to communicate securely with Bob, but Eve listens or interferes with conversation.
- Approach: Alice and Bob encrypt messages (they create ciphertexts) to keep them secure from Eve.
- Eve engages in cryptanalysis, tries to break cipher.
- Security by obscurity is dangerous. Once obscure method is discovered, all secrets are lost.
- Better to assume encryption method is known but that keys remain secret. Keys can be changed.

Three Types of Notation

| Decimal | Binary |
|---------|--------|
| 0 | 0000 |
| 1 | 0001 |
| 2 | 0010 |
| 3 | 0011 |
| 4 | 0100 |
| 5 | 0101 |
| 6 | 0110 |
| 7 | 0111 |
| 8 | 1000 |
| 9 | 1001 |
| 10 | 1010 |
| 11 | 1011 |
| 12 | 1100 |
| 13 | 1101 |
| 14 | 1110 |
| 15 | 1111 |

| Hex | Binary |
|-----|--------|
| 0 | 0000 |
| 1 | 0001 |
| 2 | 0010 |
| 3 | 0011 |
| 4 | 0100 |
| 5 | 0101 |
| 6 | 0110 |
| 7 | 0111 |
| 8 | 1000 |
| 9 | 1001 |
| А | 1010 |
| В | 1011 |
| С | 1100 |
| D | 1101 |
| E | 1110 |
| F | 1111 |

| Decimal | Binary | Octal | | | | | |
|---------|---------|-------|--|--|--|--|--|
| 0 | 000 000 | 0 0 | | | | | |
| 1 | 000 001 | 01 | | | | | |
| 2 | 000 010 | 0 2 | | | | | |
| 3 | 000 011 | 03 | | | | | |
| 4 | 000 100 | 04 | | | | | |
| 5 | 000 101 | 0 5 | | | | | |
| 6 | 000 110 | 06 | | | | | |
| 7 | 000 111 | 0 7 | | | | | |
| 8 | 001 000 | 10 | | | | | |
| 9 | 001 001 | 11 | | | | | |
| 10 | 001 010 | 12 | | | | | |
| 11 | 001 011 | 13 | | | | | |
| 12 | 001 100 | 14 | | | | | |
| 13 | 001 101 | 15 | | | | | |
| 14 | 001 110 | 16 | | | | | |
| 15 | 001 111 | 17 | | | | | |
| 16 | 010 000 | 2 0 | | | | | |

American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII)

| Dec | Hx Oct | Cha | , | Dec | Нx | Oct | Html | Chr | Dec | Нx | Oct | Html | Chr | Dec | Нх | Oct | Html Cl | nr |
|-----|--------|-----|--------------------------|-----|----|-----|-------------------|-------|-----|----|-----|-------------------|-----|-----|----|-----|---------------|-----|
| 0 | 0 000 | NUL | (null) | 32 | 20 | 040 | ⊛# 32; | Space | 64 | 40 | 100 | ¢#64; | 0 | 96 | 60 | 140 | ‰#96; | 1 |
| 1 | | | (start of heading) | 33 | 21 | 041 | &# 33; | Ţ. | | | | «#65; | | 97 | 61 | 141 | «#97; | a |
| 2 | | | (start of text) | | | | " | | 66 | 42 | 102 | B | в | 98 | 62 | 142 | b | b |
| 3 | | | (end of text) | 35 | 23 | 043 | ∝# 35; | # | 67 | 43 | 103 | C | С | 99 | 63 | 143 | «#99; | C |
| 4 | | | (end of transmission) | | | | ∝# 36; | - | | | | ∉68; | | | | | ≪#100; | |
| 5 | | | (enquiry) | | | | ∉#37; | | | | | ∉#69; | | | | | e | |
| 6 | | | (acknowledge) | | | | ∉38; | | | | | ∉#70; | | | | | f | |
| 7 | | | (bell) | | | | ∉39; | | | | | G | | | - | | «#103; | |
| 8 | 8 010 | | (backspace) | | | | ∝#40; | | | | | H | | | | | h | |
| 9 | | | (horizontal tab) | | | | ¢#41; | | | | | «#73; | | | | | i | |
| 10 | A 012 | | (NL line feed, new line) | | | | ¢#42; | | | | | a#74; | | | | | j | - |
| 11 | B 013 | | (vertical tab) | | | | «#43; | | | | | & #75; | | | | | k | |
| 12 | C 014 | | (NP form feed, new page) | | | | ¢#44; | | | | | & # 76; | | | | | l | |
| 13 | D 015 | | (carriage return) | | | | ∝#45; | | | _ | | <i>∝</i> #77; | | | | | m | |
| | E 016 | | (shift out) | | | | a#46; | | | | | ¢#78; | | | | | n | |
| | F 017 | | (shift in) | | | | 6#47; | | | | | «#79; | | | | | o | |
| | | | (data link escape) | | | | «#48; | | | | | ¢#80; | | | | | p | - |
| | | | (device control 1) | | _ | | «#49; | | | | | Q | | | | | q | |
| | | | (device control 2) | | | | «#50; | | | | | %#82; | | | | | r | |
| | | | (device control 3) | | | | «#51; | | | | | ¢#83; | | | | | s | |
| | | | (device control 4) | | | | & # 52; | | | | | «#84; | | | | | t | |
| | | | (negative acknowledge) | | | | ∝#53; | | | | | «#85; | | | | | u | |
| | | | (synchronous idle) | | | | ∝#54; | | | | | ¢#86; | | | | | v | |
| | | | (end of trans. block) | | | | ∝#55; | | | | | ¢#87; | | | | | w | |
| | | | (cancel) | | | | ∝#56; | | | | | ¢#88; | | | | | x | |
| | 19 031 | | (end of medium) | | | | ∝#57; | | | | | ¢#89; | | | | | y | |
| | 1A 032 | | (substitute) | | | | ∝#58; | | | | | ¢#90; | | | | | z | |
| | | | (escape) | | | | ≪#59; | | | | | [| | | | | { | |
| | 1C 034 | | (file separator) | | | | ∝#60; | | | | | ¢#92; | | | | | | |
| | 1D 035 | | (group separator) | | | | l; | | | | | ¢#93; | - | | | | } | |
| | 1E 036 | | (record separator) | | | | ≪#62; | | | | | «#94; | | | | | ~ | |
| 31 | 1F 037 | US | (unit separator) | 63 | ЗF | 077 | ∝#63; | 2 | 95 | 5F | 137 | ∝#95; | _ | 127 | 7F | 177 | | DEP |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Message Fragment in Binary

- Map message: no mon no fun to ASCII
- n 156 o 157 (space) 040
- 001 101 111 001 101 111 000 100 000
- m 155 o 157 n 156 (space) 040
- 001 101 101 001 101 111 001 101 111 000 100 000
- n 156 o 157 (space) 040
- 001 101 110 001 101 111 000 010 000
- f 146 u 165 n 156
- 001 010 110 001 110 101 001 101 111
- Concatenate bits to form integer message M = 0011011...

Symmetric Cryptography

- They agree on a common encryption method.
- Both Alice and Bob have the same secret key.
- Convert a text message to an integer M.
 - Example: no mon no fun
 - $\ 156\ 157\ 040\ 155\ 157\ 156\ 040\ 156\ 157\ 040\ 146\ 165\ 156$
 - Slashes between octal triplets are for humans only
 - $-M = 001\ 101\ 110\ 001\ 101\ 111\ 000\ 100\ 111\ ...$
- Encrypt M as $C = E_{K}(M)$ using function E and key K.
- Decrypt C same way, $M = E_{K}(C)$. K is secret. Symmetric!

Eve Attempts to Get Secret Key

- Ciphertext-only attack (least info)
 Eve only has ciphertext.
- Known-plaintext attack
 Eve is given plaintext-ciphertext pair(s).
- Chosen-plaintext attack
 - Eve chooses plaintext(s), gets ciphertext(s).
 She may choose plaintexts adaptively.
- Chosen-ciphertext attack (most info)
 Eve chooses ciphertext, gets plaintext.

Ciphers Introduced in Today's Lecture

- Substitution ciphers
- Polygraphic substitution ciphers
- One-time pads
- Binary one-time pads
- Advanced encryption standard (AES)
- Public-key cryptography (RSA)
- Digital signatures and hash functions


Substitution Ciphers

- Substitution ciphers permute letters in alphabet
 - E.g. Caesar replaced a letter by one three places away in the Latin alphabet.

- Caesar(3): a b c d ... x y z is replaced by d e f g ... a b c

 General substitution cipher – map letters in an alphabet to a fixed permutation of the alphabet.

Frequency of Letters in English



Breaking Substitution Ciphers

- Substitution ciphers are easily broken
- Compute the frequency of each letter
 - Find the most frequent letter, let's call it $\alpha.$
 - Almost certainly e maps to α with frequency ~12%
 - Find the second most frequent letter, β .
 - Almost certainly t maps to β with freq. ~ 9%
- Check words that result and fix mapping.

Vigenère Cipher

- Vigenère cipher (1586) is a polygraphic cipher on blocks of m letters. Given m letters (*I*₁,*I*₂, ..., *I*_m), *I*_j is shifted cyclically by k_j places for 0 ≤ k_j ≤ 25.
 - If m = 3, $k_1 = 2$, $k_2 = 1$, $k_3 = 3$, (a,g,z) mapped to (c,h,c).
 - Let's encrypt attackatdawn
 - (a,t,t)(a,c,k)(a,t,d)(a,w,n) =>(c,u,w)(c,d,n)(c,u,g)(c,x,p)
 - Encrypted message is cuwcdncugcxp
 - If m is reasonably small, easily broken by statistics.

Vigenère Cipher

- If m is reasonably small, the Vigenère cipher is easily broken by statistics.
 - How would you do that?
- The integers can be derived from a text string
 - thequickbrownfoxjumpsoverthelazydog
 - Start alphabet at 0; a \leftrightarrow 0, b \leftrightarrow 1, ..., t \leftrightarrow 19, ..., z \leftrightarrow 25,
 - 19 7 4 16 20 8 2 10 1 17 14 22 13 5 14 23 9 20 12 15 18 14 21 4 17 19 7 11 0 3 14 6
 - Does this look like a random string?
 - How many times are digits repeated?

One-Time Pad

One-time pad (Miller 1882) uses m random integers {k_j | 1 ≤ j ≤ m}, 0 ≤ k_j ≤ 25, to shift letters in a string of length ≤ m.

– The jth letter is shifted by k_i positions.

- A real one-time pad might have edible pages of digits.
- Both sender and receiver need to know shifts
- Provides perfect security when $m \ge message \ length$
- Fails when pad is reused or string is longer than m.
 - One-time pad encryption broken during Cold War.

Binary One-Time Pad Again

• Message represented as n-bit binary string.

– E.g. <u>M</u> = 010011 (a vector)

Generate random n-bit string K (the key or one-time pad)


- E.g. <u>K</u> = 100110 (a vector)

- XOR (\oplus) is defined as $1 \oplus 0 = 0 \oplus 1 = 1$ and $0 \oplus 0 = 1 \oplus 1 = 0$
- XOR message <u>M</u> with key <u>K</u> bit-by-bit to encrypt as X. $\underline{X} = E_{K}(\underline{M}) = \underline{M} \bigoplus \underline{K}$

 $- \text{ E.g. } E_{\underline{K}}(\underline{M}) = (\mathbf{0} \oplus \mathbf{1}) (\mathbf{1} \oplus \mathbf{0}) (\mathbf{0} \oplus \mathbf{0}) (\mathbf{0} \oplus \mathbf{1}) (\mathbf{1} \oplus \mathbf{1}) (\mathbf{1} \oplus \mathbf{0}) = \mathbf{1} \mathbf{1} \mathbf{0} \mathbf{1} \mathbf{0}^{\dagger}$


• Decrypt by encrypting <u>X</u> with <u>K</u> $E_{\underline{K}}(\underline{X}) = \underline{X} \oplus \underline{K} = (\underline{M} \oplus \underline{K}) \oplus \underline{K} = \underline{M} \oplus (\underline{K} \oplus \underline{K}) = \underline{M} \oplus \underline{0} = \underline{M}$

Reuse of One-Time Pad Dangerous



XORing Two Encrypted Images

$\underline{C}_1 = \underline{K} \oplus \underline{M}_1 \qquad \underline{C}_2 = \underline{K} \oplus \underline{M}_2 \qquad \underline{C}_1 \oplus \underline{C}_2 = \underline{M}_1 \oplus \underline{M}_2$






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Pseudo-Random Number Generators


- It is expensive to produce true random nos.
- Pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) generate numbers that "look" random.



Encryption algorithms can be used as PRNGs.
 – Encrypt a fixed string and represent it in binary
 – E.g. E(attackatdawn) = 0100110101001110110

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (Rough Sketch)

 AES (circa 2001) is a symmetric cipher whose inputs and outputs are 128-bit blocks. It uses an encryption key <u>K</u> of length 128, 192 or 256 bits, denoted AES-128, AES-192, AES-256.



Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

- When <u>K</u> has 128 bits, AES computes <u>X</u>₀ = <u>M</u>⊕<u>K</u> and then executes 10 rounds.
 - Each round does a substitution, permutation, mixing of results, and an XOR'ing step.
 - It is too complicated to explain here.
- AES is highly secure but can be attacked using the time spent computing – this is a side channel attack
- In 2010 AES-256 was considered highly secure.
- AES-192 and AES-256 approved for US Top Secret!

Public-Key Cryptography

- Each party has public & private keys

 Alice: Priv_{Alice}, Pub_{Alice}; Bob: Priv_{Bob}, Pub_{Bob}.
- Alice encrypts message M for Bob with

 $X = E_{K}(M)$ where $K = Pub_{Bob}$.

- Bob decrypts Alice's encrypted message with $M = E_{K^*}(X)$ where $K^* = Priv_{Bob}$.
- Decrypt using same algorithm E with private key

Origin of Public-Key Cryptography

- James Ellis, Clifford Cocks, Malcolm Williamson, invented it at GCHQ (British intelligence agency) by 1973, made public in 1997
- Diffie and Hellman propose idea publicly in '76.
- Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) gave first practical implementation in 1977.

* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography

Symmetric vs Public Key Crypto

- Symmetric key system has one key per user pair
 Thus, there are n(n-1)/2 (pairs) keys for n users
 If n = 10⁴, that's about 50x10⁶ keys!
- In public-key system, 2n keys suffice.
 <u>— Each party publishes one key, keeps other secret</u>
- Symmetric key system faster than public key.
 PK systems often used to create/exchange secret symmetric keys

RSA Public-Key System

- Modular arithmetic
 - add and multiply integers modulo n
 - result is the remainder after dividing by n.
 - E.g. (3+4) mod 5 = 2, (4*3) mod 3 = 0
- Bob's public key Pub_B is the integer pair (e,n).
- Bob's secret key is $Priv_B = d$. n = pq, two primes
- Require that e, d, and n satisfy

X^{de} mod n = X for any integer X in {0,1,2,...n-1},

RSA Public-Key System

- Alice encrypts M for Bob as C = M^e mod n
 Recall Pub_B = (e,n)
- Bob decrypts C by computing C^d mod n = M. This follows because

 $C^d \mod n = (M^e)^d \mod n = M^{de} \mod n = M$

 Bob can also encrypt M as C = M^d mod n and decrypt with C^e mod n because

 $C^{e} \mod n = (M^{d})^{e} \mod n = M^{de} \mod n = M!$

Security of RSA

- Security dependent on difficulty of finding d given e and n.
- Security closely tied to factoring n. So far integer factorization is considered very hard to do.
- A mathematical proof of security of RSA is a very important open problem.

Cryptographic Hash Functions

- A cryptographic hash function compresses a message M into fixed-length sequence H(M). Mapping is one-way and collision-resistant.
 - A function is one-way if it is computationally difficult to find M given H(M).
 - It is weakly collision-resistant if it is difficult to find a message M' with H(M') = H(M) given just H(M).
 - It is strongly collision-resistant if is difficult to find both M and M' with H(M') = H(M).

Digital Signatures

- A digital signature of a message is a way for an entity to prove that the sender sent message M.
- Alice computes H(M), hash of M, and forms
 S_{Alice}(M) by encrypting H(M) with her private key.
- She sends Bob (M, S_{Alice}(M)).
- Bob confirms that M has not changed in transit and that Alice sent it but computing H(M) and comparing it to the decryption of S_{Alice}(M)) with her public key.

Diffie-Helman Key Exchange

- Symmetric encryption is much faster than public-key encryption.
- Diffie and Helman invented a technique that two parties can use to agree on a secret key
- Both parties can use this key for symmetric encryption.

Diffie-Helman Key Exchange

- B & A choose prime *p* & primitive root *g* mod *p*.
 - g is primitive if for each r integer in {0,1,2,..., p-1}, r satisfies r = g^k mod p for some integer k.
- Alice's secret is *a* and **Bob's secret** is *b*.
 - A sends $r = g^a \mod p$ to B.
 - B sends $s = g^b \mod p$.
 - A computes $s^a \mod p$.
 - B computes *r*^b mod *p*.
- Let Q = s^a mod p = (g^b mod p)^a = g^{ba} mod p = g^{ab} mod p = g^{ab}
 mod p = r^b mod p. The common secret is Q!

Security of Diffie-Hellman

- The values of a and b are secret.
 - Alice sends $r = g^a \mod p$ to B in the clear.

- Bob sends $s = g^b \mod p$ to Alice in the clear.

- These transmissions reveal a and b IF it is possible to deduce a from r = g^a mod p or b from s = g^b mod p.
- This is the *discrete logarithm* problem.
- No polynomial time algorithm is known for it.

Review

- Symmetric Cryptography
- Public-Key Cryptography
- Cryptographic Hash Functions
- Digital Signatures
- Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange