

Garbled Circuits via Structured Encryption

Seny Kamara – Microsoft Research

Lei Wei – University of North Carolina

Garbled Circuits

Fundamental cryptographic primitive

Possess *many* useful properties

- Homomorphic

- Functional

- General-purpose

- Verifiable

- Computationally efficient (free XOR, pipelining, garbled row reduction, ...)

Applications of Garbled Circuits

Two-party computation [Yao82]

Server-aided multi-party computation [K.-Mohassel-Raykova12]

Covert multi-party computation [Chandran-Goyal-Sahai-Ostrovsky07]

Homomorphic encryption [Gentry-Halevi-Vaikuntanathan10]

Functional encryption [Seylioglu-Sahai10]

Single-round oblivious RAMs [Lu-Ostrovsky13]

Leakage-resilient OT [Jarvinen-Kolesnikov-Sadeghi-Schneider10]

One-time programs [Goldwasser-Kalai-Rothblum08]


Verifiable computation [Gennaro-Gentry-Parno10]

Randomized encodings [Applebaum-Ishai-Kushilevitz06]

Yao's Garbled Circuits


AND:

0	0	0
0	1	0
1	0	0
1	1	1



$\text{Enc}_{K_0}(\text{Enc}_{K_0}(K_0))$
$\text{Enc}_{K_0}(\text{Enc}_{K_1}(K_0))$
$\text{Enc}_{K_1}(\text{Enc}_{K_0}(K_0))$
$\text{Enc}_{K_1}(\text{Enc}_{K_1}(K_1))$

Yao's Garbled Circuits



Defining Garbled Circuits

Garbling Scheme

$$\text{Grb}(1^k, C) \implies (\tilde{C}, \mathbf{dk}, sk)$$

$$\text{GI}(sk, x) \implies \tilde{x}$$

$$\text{Eval}(\tilde{C}, \tilde{x}) \implies \tilde{y}$$

$$\text{Dec}(\mathbf{dk}_i, \tilde{y}) \implies \{\perp, y_i\}$$



Input Privacy

SIM1: “ $(\tilde{C}, \tilde{x}, dk)$ can be simulated given only \tilde{C} and $f(x)$ ”

SIM2: “ $(\tilde{C}, \tilde{x}, dk)$ can be simulated given only C and $f(x)$,
even when x is chosen as a function of \tilde{C} ”

Designing Garbled Circuits

General-Purpose Garbling Schemes



BOOLEAN CIRCUITS

- [Yao82]: public-key techniques
- [Lindell-Pinkas09]: double encryption
- [Naor-Pinkas-Sumner99]: hash functions
- [Bellare-Hoang-Rogaway12]: dual-key ciphers

ARITHMETIC CIRCUITS

- [Applebaum-Ishai-Kushilevitz12]: affine randomized encodings

General-Purpose Garbling Schemes

Boolean circuits

Efficient: bit-wise operations (e.g., shifts, comparisons, ...)

Inefficient: arithmetic operations

Arithmetic circuits

Efficient: arithmetic operations (e.g., additions, multiplications, polynomials, ...)

Inefficient: bit-wise operations

Many problems are neither

[Naor-Nissim01]: circuits with lookup tables \approx RAMs


[Barkol-Ishai05]: constant-depth circuits

[Gordon et al.12]: DB lookups



Not Garbling Schemes

Structured Circuits



Efficient for “structured problems”

Search, graphs, DFAs, branching programs

Can be garbled

2PC, homomorphic encryption, one-time programs, verifiable computation, ...

Structured Encryption [Chase-K.10]

$$\text{Gen}(1^k) \Rightarrow K$$


$$\text{Enc}_K(\delta, \bar{m}) \Rightarrow \gamma$$

$$\text{Token}_K(q) \Rightarrow \tau$$

$$\text{Query}(\gamma, \tau) \Rightarrow I$$

$$\text{Dec}_K(c_i) \Rightarrow m_i$$

How to Garble a Structured Circuit



Correctness

- Encrypt data structures
- Associativity (store & release tokens)
- Dimensionality (merge tokens)

Security

- CQA1 enc \Rightarrow SIM1 & UNF1 garbling
- CQA2 enc \Rightarrow SIM2 & UNF2 garbling

Previous Structured Encryption

Associativity

[Curtmola-Garay-K.-Ostrovsky06]: CQA1 & CQA2 inverted index encryption


[Chase-K.10]: CQA2 matrix, graph & web graph encryption

Dimensionality

All previously-known constructions are 1-D

2-D Matrix Encryption

1-D Matrix Encryption [Chase-K.10]



Encrypt: permute & XOR with PRF-based pad

Search: $\tau(1,3) = F_K(1,3), P(1,3)$

2-D Matrix Encryption

	1	2	3
1	m_{11}	m_{12}	m_{13}
2	m_{21}	m_{22}	m_{23}
3	m_{31}	m_{32}	M_{33}

$$P : [n] \rightarrow [n]$$
$$Q : [n] \rightarrow [n]$$



	$C_{1,3}$	

=

$$\text{Synth}[F_K(\text{row} | P(1)) , F_K(\text{col} | Q(3))] \oplus m_{13}$$

Encrypt: permute & XOR with synthesizer-based pad

Search: $\tau(1) = F_K(\text{row} | P(1))$ $\tau(3) = F_K(\text{col} | Q(3))$

Matrix Garbling Schemes

[Chase-K.10] + synthesizers \Rightarrow SIM1-secure Garb schemes for matrices

[Chase-K.10] + synthesizers + SIM1-to-SIM2 \Rightarrow SIM2-secure schemes for matrices

Observation: Yao garbled gate \iff 2-D associative CQA1 matrix encryption scheme

Applications

New Special-Purpose Garbling Schemes!

DFAs

Branching programs

Boolean circuits w/ cheaper gate evaluation than Yao

Adjacency queries on graphs


Neighbor queries on graphs

Focused subgraph queries on web graphs

} Our transform + [Chase-K.10]

More efficient: Two-party computation, server-aided multi-party computation, covert multi-party computation, homomorphic encryption, functional encryption, single-round oblivious RAMs, leakage-resilient OT, one-time programs, verifiable computation, randomized encodings, ...

Secure Two-Party Graph Computation



Are  and  friends?

Who are  's friends?

Find the friends of anyone who likes my product

Find the friends of anyone with disease X

Thanks